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IN TEE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
LITTLE AMERICA REFINING
COMPANY,
PlaintiffAp?ellant,
vs.

CASE NO. 17331

JESSE ALBERT LEYBA,
Defendant, and

SVEN HE IMBERG,
DefendantRe.spondent.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action for pro?erty damage to appellant's
service station arising from a collision between defendant
Leyba's vehicle and a vehicle driven by respondent.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried before a jury on August 28, 1980.
At the close of appellant's case, respondent moved for a directed
verdict which was granted by the court.

Default judgment was

entered against defendant Leyba.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an affirmance of the trial court's
directed verdict dis~issing appellant's case as to respondent.
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STATE~ENT

OF FACTS

In the early morning hours of April 2, 1979, a collL
occurred between vehicles driven by defendant Leyba and responc
which resulted in damages to appellant's service station on Bee
Street in Salt Lake City, Utah.

(T., pp.

118-119)

The accident occurred when the vehicle driven by
Leyba collided with the left rear portion of respondent's
truck, causing respondent's truck to slide into the gas pumps
at appellant's station and resulting in a fire.

(T., pp. 149·

150)

At trial, appellant's counsel attempted to introduce
testimony concerning the speed of the vehicles involved froma 1
employee of the service station, Barry Bell, who witnessed the
accident.

The Court sustained objections to the testimony on

foundational grounds and excluded it from consideration.
(T., pp. 95-96)

Respondent testified to a series of incidents which
occurred between a passenger in his vehicle and the occupants
of the Leyba vehicle as they drove north on State Street shorti;
before the accident involved herein.

He further testified that

he turned left at the intersection of State Street and

Thi~

North and proceeded on Third North to Main Street where he
turned right.

At that time, the Leyba vehicle, which had turnr

right at Third North, reappeared behind respondent's truck,
cut around respondent's vehicle and '_:larked
respondent's truck.

sideways in front c'

Respondent stop9ed his truck and an

-2-
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altercation occurred between a passenger from respondent's
vel1icle and one frorr Leyba' s vehicle.

A fistfight between the

passengers ensued and when it ended, respondent drove away from
the scene down Victory Road.

(T., pp. 145-149)

On direct, respondent testified that he did not
participate in the incidents or fight between the passengers
other than that he was driving one of the vehicles.
~stified

He

that, after the fight ended, he drove away at a

normal rate of speed, oroceeded d01vn Victory Road when the
Leyba vehicle came up behind him at a high rate of speed, rearended him causing his truck to slide into the gas pumps.

At

no time was he racing w.fth or attempting to get away from the
Leyba truck.

(T., pp. 151-154)

At the close of appellant's case, the Court granted
respondent's motion for a directed verdict on the basis that
the evidence of negligence by respondent was insufficient to
submit the case to the jury.

(T., p. 171)

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT RULED CORRECTLY IN
REFUSIHG TO ADMIT TESTIMONY CONCER..,.._.ING THE SPEED OF THE VEHICLZS
Appellant's counsel attempted to introduce testimony
by Barry Bell, an employee of appellant who witnessed the
accident, concerning the speed, in miles per hour, of respondent's
and Leyba's vehicles.

Bell testified he saw the vehicles coming

down Victory Road prior to the collision and that he had
observed "millions" of cars coming down the same stretch of
-3-
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road.

(T., pp. 94-95)

However, at no tiMe did counsel for

appellant elicit testimony from Mr. Bell that he drove a car
himself, that he had observed his speedometer while driving,
i.e., that he had a basis for estimating the speed of vehicles,
Simply stating he had watched vehicles come down Victory Road,
without any evidence of his familiarity with operating a car,
is insufficient as a foundation for the admission of opinion
testimony as to the speed of a vehicle.
It was precisely on foundational grounds that the
trial court sustained respondent's objections to the testimony
of Mr. Bell as to the estimated speed of the vehicles.
Respondent has no quarrel with the proposition that a layman's
opinion estimating speed of a vehicle is admissible where a
foundation for such opinion is made.
Both cases cited by appellant in support of its
argument that Bell's opinion should have been admissible
recognize that such testimony is proper only when there is a
foundation for the same.

The Court in Townsend v. hThatton,

21 Ariz. App. 556, 521 P.2d 1014 (1974), cited the case of
Southwestern FreightLines, Ltd. v. Floyd, 58 Ariz. 249, 119
P.2d 120 (1941), in support of the proposition that even a
non-driver could testify as to speed where qualified by experier.
In Floyd, supra, a 12 year old girl was allowed to
testify as to the speed of a vehicle based on her experience of
riding on many occasions with her father and observing the car's
speedometer as a basis for estimating speed.
Similarly, in Potts v. Brown, Wyo., 452 P.2d 975
(1969),
the speed estimates of two teen-age witnesses were
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based on their driving experience, observation of other cars
while driving within speed limits, etc.
Appellant's position in the case at bar simply presupposes that his witness was qualified by experience to
estimate speed without any foundation that he had ever driven
a car or ridden in one himself.
The trial court herein ruled correctly in excluding
the testimony of Bell where there was no proper foundation.
The question of adrnissibili ty of opinion testimony is within the
discretion of the trial court and should not be upset without
a clear showing of abuse of discretion.

Ewell and Son, Inc.

v. Salt Lake City Corp., 27 Utah 2d 188, 493 P.2 1283 (1972).
POINT II
THE EVIDENCE OF NEGLIGENCE BY RESPONDENT
IS INSUFFICIENT AS A MATTER OF LAW
Appellant presupposes that a race or chase situation
existed between the Leyba vehicle and respondent's vehicle and
that the supposed chase was the direct and proximate cause of
the damage to appellant's service station.

The evidence adduced

at trial simply fails to support that thesis.
The key element of proof in any case involving an
ler.

automobile collision is whether or not the driver of a vehicle
operated it negligently so as to proximately cause damage to

Ji

another party.
Appellant's theory of the case presumes that
respondent was negligent simply because he was the driver of a
vehicle in which a passenger became involved in a series of
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incidents with the occupants of another vehicle which cull'linat'
in a fistfight.

No evidence was offered that respondent operat

his vehicle in a careless or negligent manner at any time from
State Street through to the point of collision at appellant's
service station.
The only evidence of negligent driving was as to the
Leyba vehicle.

The Leyba vehicle swerved around respondent,

turned off in a different direction, turned around and chased
respondent down and cut off his vehicle.

A brief altercation

ensued, in which respondent did not participate, after which
respondent drove off at a normal rate of speed.

The Leyba

vehicle later negligently collided with the rear of respondent''
vehicle causing the damage to appellant's service station.
Appellant sought at trial to derive an inference of
negligence from respondent's purported involvement in or failur

1

to restrain the tortious conduct of respondent's passenger.
Counsel for respondent objected to the attempt to introduce an)
testimony as to the incidents on State Street or the fight
between occupants of the vehicles.
The matter was argued at some length to the court out·
side the presence of the jury.

(T., pp. 124-140)

The court

found that appellant's authorities in support of his argument
were actually contrary to his position.

The incidents prior

to the collision did not constitute a chain of negligent acts
amounting to concurrent negli9ence by respondent.

(T., p. 140)

The court ruled that the evidence of the prior incidents would
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be admitted but that appellant would be prohibited from relying
upon it as a basis for ~resuming negligence or liability as to
respondent.

(T., pp. 140-142)

Appellant relies heavily on the case of Hillyard v.
Utah By-Products Co., l Utah 2d 143, 263 P.2d 287 (1953), in
support of the proposition that joint liability may exist where
separate, but concurrent acts of negligence combine to cause
injury.

However, Hillyard, supra, is readily distinguishable

from the case at bar.

That case involved the issue of negligence

as between the driver of a truck who had parked it five feet
into the roadway and the driver of a car which collided with the
truck.

There was no series of claimed negligent acts nor any

claim of a race or chase.
The evidence of a race or chase in the instant case
falls of its own weight.

Appellant relies on the conclusory

statements of two witnesses, Bell and Boyle, that the two vehicles
appeared to be racing down Victory Road.

No competent testimony

was offered in support of those conclusions as to any speeding
or negligent driving by respondent.
'l'he cases cited by appellant on the issue of a race
clearly involved testimony that vehicles were speeding or chasing each other.

In Lemons v. Kelly, 239 Ore. 354, 397 P.2d

784 (1964), both the plaintiff and defendants testified that a
race had occurred, and the case turned on whether or not the
race had terminated prior to the accident.
In the instant case, the series of events prior to
the collision came to rest at the point where the fistfight
-7-
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occurred.

At that point, respondent drove away at a normal

rate of speed and was heading home.

The Leyba vehicle then carr,

up behind respondent and collided with him while attempting to
pass.

Leyba's own testimony at a deposition in this case was

that, rather than racing respondent down Victory Road, he wa 5
hurrying to seek assistance for his companion who had been
injured in the fistfight.
There can be no dispute that respondent's vehicle
sliding into the gas pumps was an actual cause, or cause-infact, of appellant's damages.
able that the

However, it is equally indisput-

sole legal, or proximate, cause of the damages to

appellant's station was Leyba's negligent act of rear-ending
respondent's vehicle on Victory Road.
Appellant's counsel, throughout his brief, assumes
facts which were not in evidence at trial and attempts to link
them in a supposedly concurrent chain of negligent acts culminat·
ing in the collision.

There is simply no competent, tangible

shred of evidence to support that claim.
The trial court was correct in ruling that the evidenci
of negligence by respondent was insufficient to submit the case
to the jury.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT APPLIED TEE PROPER
STANDARD IN GRANTING A DIRECTED
VERDICT
Appellant correctly states the standard to be employee
by the trial court in considering a motion for a directed verdic'
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1,e., the court must view the evidence in a light most favorable
to the non-moving party and construe the controverted facts, if
any, in that party's favor.
123 Utah 387, 259 P. 2d 885

Boskovich v. Dtah Construction co.,
(1953).

If the court finds that reasonable minds cannot differ
as to the lack of negligence in a case such as the instant one,
then it is obliged to direct a verdict as to the lack of liability.
The Court, in the present case, ruled properly in that
the uncontroverted facts established that the only negligent act
which proximately caused the damage to appellant was Leyba' s
negligence in rear-ending respondent.

The fact that some sort

of tortious incident occurred prior to the collision is irrelevant
absent some showing of negligent operation of the truck driven
by respondent.

Appellant is entitled to no inference of negligence

by respondent regardless of whether or not respondent was in-

valved in a dozen fistfights prior to the collision.
The trial court correctly concluded herein that the
evidence of negligence by respondent was insufficient, such that
reasonable minds could not

diff~r,

and was compelled thereby

to direct a verdict dismissing appellant's case.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, respondent respectfully requests
this Court to affirm the judgment of the District Court granting
a directed verdict.
Respectfully submitted,

FcJ~lJiilsh ~v-<L
Attorney for Respondent
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